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NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action, based on "Boundary by Acqui-
escence'', which adjudicated, by summary judgment, the 
rights of the parties in and to a wedge-shaped strip of 
land which extends generally East-West and is geo-
graphically situated in Bountiful, Davis County, between 
the appellants' property on the North (hereinafter called 
"the Davis property") and the respondents' property 
on the South (hereinafter called "the Riley property"). 
1 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Respondents' motion for summary judgment was 
granted, and ordered following rehearing. 
Thereafter, a period of thirty days was granted to 
appellants to collect evidence to show an issue of fact. 
No additional evidence was brought forward by the 
appellants. 
Judge Wahlquist in granting the summary judgment 
stated: 
''. . . defendants have substantial evidence 
as follows, Number one, that they have held pos-
session of the land in question for a period of 
going back more than 26 years and that there is 
no evidence or any assertion or any other type of 
ownership in existence for that period. The 
Court further believes that the construction of 
the garage in the general pictures of the area is 
such that they would imply a boundary line such 
as the construction of the garage on lands is evi-
dence of some claim of ownership at the time it 
was done. The Court believes that the dead man 
statute would preclude the conversation between 
the two predecessors in interest to go back into 
the thirties in this action. I believe that statute 
to be moot in that it does not show any claim 
by plaintiffs in this instance, any claim of thiR 
land in use beyond the fence as here testified to. 
The Court believes that the evidence of the 
defendants as such in this case would have to he 
accepted by a finder of fact unless refuted. 
The Court further finds that there is no evi-
dence to refute it. 
The Court therefore grants the defendants' 
motion for summary judgment.'' 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents submit that the granted summary judg-
ment is well found in law and fact. Therefore, the trial 
court's decision should be affirm€'d. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Tlw Hiley property (see defendants' Exhihit 1) was 
arf]nired through vVarranty Deed from Daniel K. and 
Priscilla Davis (grandparents of appellant Ross J. 
D1n·is) h>· L€'onidas G. Rile>· (deceased husband of re-
spo1Hlent Lois Riley aml father of respondents Glen and 
Lron Ril0y) in ~rarch of 1920. (R-69 to 71, Ex. A) 
Sinrt' 1020, the Riley family, consisting of husband. 
L0nniclas CT. Rile>·, wife, respondent Lois Riley, and sons, 
rr>spoll(]P11t Glen and Leon Riley, has owned in one man-
nrr or another, and has had exclusiYe possession, exclu-
sive control. exclusin• use and exclnsi,·e cnstod~· of the 
lm1c1 consisting- d (a) the Riley property, and (b) the 
nwntione<1 wrdze-shaped strip of l:rnd in disnute. 'rh0 
~trip of land is the portion cross hate heel in defendants' 
Exhibit 1 and extends up to a visibl~, marked line run-
ning along the North edge of the strip of land. Leonidas 
G. Rik»·. who died in 1964, was the sole owner of the 
Riley property for 36 years. In 1956 the real property 
was placed under the joint ownership of Leonidas G. 
Rile~· and his wife, respondent Lois B. Riley. (Deposi-
tion of Lois Riley, Ex. 1) 
Since 1920 the Davis famil>·, consisting of grand-
father. Daniel K. Da,·is, father, Daniel Murra>· Davis, 
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and son, appellant Ross J. Davis, has owned, i11 one man-
ner or another, and has had only exclusive possession 
and control and use of the Davis property up to, hut 
not beyond, the North edge of the strip of land. ( Deposi-
tion of Daniel Murray Davis, page 4; R-37, Ex. A) 
Thus, it is undisputed that the Rileys and Davises 
had been adjoining landowners for 46 years at the time 
this litigation was instituted. 
A fence, extending generally East-\Vest along the 
North edge of the mentioned wedge-shaped strip of land, 
existed when the Riley property was acquired by Leo-
nidas G. Riley in 1920. ( Deposition of Danie 1 ~I urray 
Davis, page 8, lines 4-6) The fence constisted of per-
manently anchored wood posts and barbed wire. (Depo-
sition of Leon Riley, page 4, lines 14-26; Dcpositio!l or' 
Glen Riley, page 6, line 28 to page 7, line 9; Deposition 
of Lois Riley, page 21, lines 17-24) 
The fence and its geographical relation to the dri\"t'-
way is clearly illustrated in the photographs attached to 
pages 3, 12, 19 and 29 of defendants' Exhibit 6, R--!2. 
Four posts of the original fence remain standing (DP-
fendants' Exhibits 1, 3, 5 and 7, R-42) 
The fence demarked the North edge of a drinway, 
constructed by Leonidas G. Riley in about 1924 when he 
also erected a garage. (Appellants' Brief, page 4, lines 
2-3; R-70, paragraph 7; T-7, 8) The garage, about one-
half of which rests on the strip of land in question (De-
fendants' Ex. 1, Ex. 3), still remains in its original 1924 
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location. (Defendants' Ex. 6, page 10, R-42; Deposition 
nf Loi,-, Ril0y, page 20, lines 10-12; T-16) The magnitude 
of encroachment of the garage upon the strip of land in 
question is shown graphically on defendants' Exhibit 1 
mid pietorially on defendants' Exhibits 4 and 5, R-42. 
Thr South edge of the strip of land in question runs ap-
proximatel~, up the middle of the clrh'eway ( a11out fonr 
fret from the North Nlge of th0 house) along a line ex-
trrn1ing lietween the two grouncl positions identified hy 
the do"·nwarcl end of the staff held b~T the person in the 
photographs, (1efendant,q' Exhibit 4, which was taken fac-
i1w: East, and defendants' Exhibit 5, which was taken 
faeing \Y 0st. Observe that the space between the identi-
fi0!l South edge of the strip of land and the North edge 
of the Riley house is so small as not to be capable of 
per sr sening as a driveway. (Also see Deposition of 
Olrn Ril0y, page 9, lines 2-6) 
The driveway now also remains in its original 1924 
position (compare photograph, defendants' Exhibit 4, 
with the lo>Yest photograph on page 29 of defendants' 
FJxhihit 6, R-42), ha'.'ing been replenished with gravel 
from time to time. Though unsuccessful attempts were 
made to acquire additional land North of the strip of 
lnnd in question (T-9, 10, 13; Deposition of Daniel Mur-
ray Davis, page 10, line 28 to page 11, line 3) to widen 
the Riley drinway to accommodate truck traffic, the 
width of the drivewa~' remains today the same as it was 
in 1024 when constructed. (Defendants' Exs. 4 and 6, 
pagr 29, R-42; Deposition of Glen Riley, page 8, lines 
8-14; Deposition of Lois Rile~T' page 16, lines 18-27 and 
pt:ge 23, lines 23-29; T-8) 
5 
The land upon which the garage and driveway rest 
and the small remaining land portion which comprise the 
strip of land in question has remained under the exclu-
si,,e care, custody, occupancy, possession and control of 
the Riley family since the early 1920 's. (Deposition of 
Lois Riley, page 24, lines 10-21; T-11, 12, 17, rn, 22) 
It should be remembered that at the point in time 
when Leonidas G. Riley constructed the drive,rny and 
garage just North of the Riley house, the Riley property 
consisted on the order of about 300 front feet situated 
along First East in Bountiful, Utah, almost all of thr· 
front feet being South of the Riley house. (Depositio11 
of Lois Riley, page 26, line 3; R-69, 70) It is inconceiY-
able that a person owning that much frontage would 
intentionally locate a garage and driveway on property 
belonging to another. 
There is no evidence of any member of the Da\'is 
family raising any objection whatsoever to the erection 
of the garage and the construction of the driveway leacl-
ing from the street to the garage. In fact the garage waR 
placed by Leonidas G. Riley" ... so that water draining 
from the garage roof would clearly drip from the eaws 
of the garage upon the Riley property .... " (R-70) 
Additional monuments consisting of permanent Yisi-
ble markings have been placed by Leonidas G. Riley 
along the mentioned fence line from time to time over 
the years. As can be appreciated by reference to de-
fendants' Exhibit 4 and defendants' Exhibit 6, page 29, 
lower photo, R-42, the mentioned driveway has always 
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<1c·<·npiPd tlw approximatr 8 or 9 foct ''"irlth which exists 
lid1Yern thr Riley house and the mentionPd fence' line. 
Specifically, in al1ont J!"r~+. Leonidas G. Riley awl 
l1is wifr, respornlent Lois Riley, plantecl a numher of 
.---;iacecl ee<lar tre<':; arnl onr 1Yalm1t trer dirPrtl:· '11nug the 
f1•11rc> linr. ('r-6, 7, lG, 17) 'rh<>s<> reclar trP<>s m1cl their 
f1•11c<' line' clispositi011 are shown clearly in the photo-
c:rnphs attached to pa~es 6, 8, !l, 12. rn and 20 of defend-
:rnts' Fixhihit 6, R-42. 
Later, in about 1951, because the cedar trees were 
scratching automobiles tra,·ersing the dri,·e"·ay (T-6), 
all hnt onr of the cedar trees was remo\·ecl and replaced 
l1v a (•oncr<>tr retaining wall, also situated c1irectl:· 
along the mentioned fence line. (Deposition of Leon 
Rile:·, pag-e 3, lines 2:i-30: Deposition of Glen Riley, 
page 0, lines 11-18: Deposition of Lois Riley, page 18. 
liPJIS H-Hl, page 21, lines 2::l-26: T-6) rrhe one remaining 
errlar tree, shown at the left in the photog-raph identi-
fircl as defendants' Exhihit :1, R-42, is also shown as it 
a )'1Jea r<>rl shortl:· after ini tia 1 planting in the top photo-
~rn ph attached to paQ,"e 10 of defendants' ExhiHt G. Thc> 
trnnk of the one remaining cedar tree (shown at the left 
in the photograph identified as defendants' Exhibit 3: 
R-42) and the trunk of the remaining walnut tree are 
<lisposecl approximately in line with the retaining wall. 
The retaining wall is clearly illustrated as being in direct 
liJl(•ar alignment ·with the four remaining fence posts on 
Great Basin Mapping and Snrny Company map, en-
tit1Pd "prepared for Ross J. DaYis' ', and found follo\Y-
ing R-45. 
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The concrete retaining ·wall, which was installed lJy 
Leonidas G. Riley along with the assistance of his two 
sons, respondents Glen K. and Leon Riley (DPpositio 11 
of Gleu Riley, page 5, lines 22-23, page 8, lines 15-19; 
Deposition of Leon Riley, page 4, lines 27-29), is shown 
in the photographs identified as defendants' Exhibit~ 
2 and 4, R-42. 
The Riley family has from time to time planted 
flo\vers and the like upon the strip of land in question 
as can be appreciated by reference to defendants' Exhi-
bit 3, R-42, showing Iris adjacent the one remaining 
cedar tree at the left of the photograph. (Deposition of 
Lois Riley, page 24, line 29) 
No land or boundary survey was e\·er conclndecl hy 
any member of the Davis or the Riley families during 
the 46-year period from 1920 to 1966 (Deposition of 
Daniel Murray Davis, page 14, line 24 to page 15, line 2: 
Deposition of Glen Riley, page 8, lines 20-26; Deposition 
of Lois Riley, page 22, lines 20-23), even though the 
Riley and Davis families were adjoining landowners dur-
ing the entire mentioned 46-year period. No suney hy 
either family preceded or accompanied the erection of 
the Riley garage and the construction of the dri\'e\\·<1:· 
leading to the garage on the strip of land. No sun-ey lJy 
either party preceded or accompanied the placement of 
the cedar trees along the fence line. No sun-ey hy eitllC'r 
party preceded or accompanied the construction of the 
retaining v.all along the fence line. 
Beyond a doubt, the location of such monument:;, 
physically dividing property exclusinly possessed anil 
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used hy one neigh hor (the Rileys) from that exrlusively 
possessed and used hy another neighbor (the Davises) 
had to inherently be fraught with 11ncertainty in relation 
to where the boundary between the properties described 
in (keels of record might actually prove to be. 
The acquiescence to and continuous honoring of such 
;Ill uncertain ph~vsical dividing line between properties 
for four and one-half decades is undisputed. 
Certainly, actions by the parties and their predes-
sors in interest over four and one-half decades speak 
louder than words uttered the year following. At no 
time between 1920 and the present dispute, which came 
into being in 1966, has the Davis family ever challenged 
the Riley family's rights to the strip of land in question. 
During the four and one-half decades, no member of the 
Da,'is family has ever complained of or guarded against 
eneroachment by the Riley family upon the strip of land 
in question. During the four and one-half decades, the 
Da,·is family has had no custody, possession, use, or con-
trol of the strip of land in question and has nen•r insist-
0cl on such. All acts of both the Davis family ancl the 
Riley family have recognized the visibly marked fence 
line as the physical dividing line between their respectin 
properties. 
Daniel Murray Davis, father of appellant Ross .J. 
Da,·is, C'OllC'edecl that the fence line was disposed "he-
tween" the Riley and Ross Davis properties (Deposition 
of Daniel J\forray Davis, page 7, lines 8-18), thus rec-
ognizing the fence line as physically cfo·idi11g the Riley 
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property from tlw Davis property and including the 
strip of land in question as part of the Ril0y property. 
Appellant, Ross J. Davis, honored th0 fence line as 
the physical houndan·-in-fact lwhye0n th0 Dm·is a11d 
Riley properti0s as recentl~· as earl:· 1966 (T-22), only 
a few weeks before discovering through surv0~· that tlir· 
described property line was not coincident \Yi th t lw f enc(• 
line. (T-19 to 22) 
E,·en though 36 days expired betwe011 the hearin!! 
(Nm·emher 29, 1966) and re-hearing (,January 4, 1967) 
on motion for summary judgment, and enn though t ]ip 
Court on Januan· 4, 1967 (T-26), granted appellants 30 
days for submitting new e,·idence suggestive of an issnP 
of fact, no competent and admissible evidence was intro-
duced which would possibly indicate permissin use by 
the Riley family of the strip of lanfl in question for tlir· 
mentioned four and one-half decades. Ahnndant, com-
petent testimony is present in the record that the exclu-
sive possession, control, custody and use of the strip of 
land in question by the Rily family was because the:· con-
sidered the land as Riley property (Deposition of Lois 
Rile~·, page 14, lines 24-28; page 15, line 26; pag<' 18, 
lines 17-22; page 22, lines 15-19) and did not permis-
sively use and occupy the strip of land. (Deposition of 
Lois Riley, Supra, and page 16, line 24-27; page 27, 
lines 12-22; T-11, 12, 17, 19; Deposition of Leon Riley, 
pag0 3, lines 7-10, page 6, lines 19-22: Deposition of Glen 
Riley, page 9, lines 11-20) Daniel :Murray Davis's 
attempt to testify that land North of the fence line, and 
accordingly North of the land in question ( T-9, 10; Depo-
10 
sit ion of Daniel :i\I urray Davis, page 10, line 27 to page 
11, line 20), was used permissively by the Riley family 
was correctly excluded by the Trial Court as obviously 
heing contrary to dead man's statute, 78-24-2(3), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. (T-23) 
Council for appellants was not surprised by this 
exclusion, as he was apprised of the objection on .July 22, 
1966 (Deposition of Lois Riley, page 16, line 30), over 
four months before the November 29, 1966, hearing on 
motion for summary judgment. 
A verified but hearsay statement by Kelly S. Davis, 
brother of appellant Ross J. Davis, in the same regard, 
did not ''present a sufficiently strong position to justify 
reopening the question once submitted". (T-26) 
ARGUMENT 
The law presented by respondents and relied on by 
the Trial Court at the hearing and re-hearing on the 
motion for summary judgment, made by both appellants 
and respondent with full consent by both counsels, eom-
prised two cases, namely King v. Fronk, 14 U.2d 135, 
~78 P.2d 893 (Utah 1963) and Fuoco v. Williams, 15 U.2d 
L'56, :398 P.2d 143 (Utah 1964). (T-15; R-59) These cases 
set forth the controlling law as related to the subject 
matter of the present controversy, the principle issue 
of which is whether or not respondents now own the strip 
of land inquestion by reason of the doctrine of '' boun-
dary by acquiescence". 
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It is surprising that si11ce .T11c1g0 \Vahlqnist 's rnling 
was hased on the Frn11k and 1Villiam.c: opi11ions (R-:J~). 
that appellants make no mention of these ro11trolli11g 
cases. It would seem that the weakness of appella11t:o::' 
case is initiall>- e\-ic1ent hy th0 H'l'>- failun• to rite ani] 
apply tlw current "houndar>- hy acqniesrence'' law, a~ 
set forth in Fronk and Williams. 
Briefly, the Williams opinion unequi\·orall>· summar-
ir,es the respediYe burdens of the parties facing a honn-
dary by acquiescence issue. The burden of the pa rt;: 
claiming land by "acquiescence" IS rlearly d01ineatr<1 
hy the fol1owing language: 
"These elements are: (1) occupation up to 
a visible line marked definitely by monument~. 
fences or huildings, and (2) acquiescence in the 
line as a boundary (3) for a long period of ye::m 
( 4) by adjoining landowners.'' 
If he who seeks land under the doctrine of honrnlary 
by acquiescence is able to hear the mentioned four-point 
burden. 
" ... the presumption that a binding agree-
ment exists settling a dispute or uncertain hotm-
dary ... " 
comes into being. 
Such a presumption, once established, can he oYer-
turned only if he who assails the title by acquiescrnrc 
IS able to 
" show by competent evidence that a 
houndary was not thus established." 
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With the above-mentioned law in mind, the trial 
court did not pass judgment on the issue of whether or 
not land had passed by "acquiescence" simply by ac-
cepting currently-professed, heretofore-undisclosed hincl-
·"ight-intent of the parties. The trial court properly de-
term in eel the acquiescence issue based on the foregoing 
la,,- as measured through the continuous acts and conduct 
liy both the Riley and Davis families, all of whom con-
sistently honored and recognized the fence line as the 
physical division between the Riley and Davis properties 
for four and one-half decades. 
Specifically, it is undisputed that the Riley and 
Davis families had been adjoining landO"wners for 46 
years prior to the present clispute. 
The fence line, originally marked by permanently 
ai1ehored 'mod posts and barhecl ·wire spanning between 
the postf; has at all times been treated by the Riley and 
Davis families as the physical dividing line between the 
DaYis pro1wrty and the Riley property. Daniel ~Iurray 
Da,·is a('knowleclged the fence line as the physical divi-
sion hetween the Davis and Riley properties. (Deposition 
of Daniel ~Iurray Davis, page 7, lines 17 and 18), and he 
acknowledged that the driveway was the unchallenged 
possession of Leonidas G. Riley. (Deposition of Daniel 
.\Iurray Da,·is, page 10, line 28 to page 11, line 3). He 
confirms that the cedar trees planted by Leonidas G. 
Riley were " ... between the fence posts .... " (Deposi-
tion of Daniel Murray Davis, page 11, lines 18-20) Daniel 
.\Iurray Da ,·is never challenged the Rileys' exclusin 
rig-ht to the property as he stated he '' ... nenr dit1 
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have ... '' any kind of a dispute concerning the boun-
daries between the properties. (Deposition of Daniel 
Murray Davis, page 12, lines 28-30) Mr. Daniel Murra:· 
Davis thought that th<' concrete retaining wall wa~ 
'' ... six or seven feet ... '' X orth of the original fenc·(· 
line (Deposition of Daniel Murray Davis, page 13, lines 
2J-2B and page 16, line ), hut this is incorrect. Compare 
the two photographs consisting of defendants' F,xhihib 
4 and 6, page 29, lowest photograph, R-42. Daniel ~[m_ 
ra:r Dads and other members of the Da,'is family wrrr· 
willing to accept, until now, the uncertaint>· in honmlar:> 
which comes by placing monuments to physically cfo-id\· 
properties without the benefit of a competent land snr-
Vf'~V. Before 1966, such sun·ey was ne,·er requestC'r1 ln-
the Davises. (Deposition of Daniel "'.\Iurray Drn·is, pn!.!:1· 
14, line 24 to page 13, lin<> 2) 
Significantly, four of the original fence posts still 
remain in virtually the same position occupied whf'll the· 
Riley property was purchased by Leonidas G. Rile:· in 
1920. (Defendants' Exs. 3, 5 and 7, R-42) 
Appellant, Ross .J. Davis, in early 1966, before cfo-
covering by survey the whereabouts of the described 
boundary, recognized the fenceline by planting three pine 
trees just inches North of f enceline. (Defendants' Ex. 7. 
R-42; T-19 to 22) Ross ,J. Davis later in Court acknowl-
<:>do-ed that the sun·eyed line was about four f<:>et South ~ . 
of where he had planted the three pine trees (T-21) just 
we<:>ks before. Thus, Ross J. Davis treated the fencelinc 
as the ph:·sical dividing line between the Riley and DnYi' 
properties. 
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Leonidas G. Riley continually placed additional per-
manent monuments of different types up to and directly 
along the mentioned fenceline. These monuments include 
a garage (erected in 1924), the North wall of which is 
ahout two feet South of the fenceline (Deposition of 
Leon Riley, page 5, lines 26-29; R-60, 61) and which en-
croaches by about 50% of its width upon the strip of 
land; a gravel driveway installed up to the fence line, 
also about 1924; a number of cedar trees placed in lineal 
relation directly along the fenceline in about 1934; and 
a concrete retaining wall, installed in about 1951, directly 
along the fenceline and spanning almost the entire length 
of the driveway . 
.. :\ t no time preceding or accompanying the place-
ment of the mentioned permanent and visible markings 
along the f enceline were land boundary surveys con-
ducted hy any member of the Riley or Davis families. 
(Deposition of Daniel Murray Davis, page 14, line 24 
to page 15, line 2; Deposition of Lois Riley, page 22, 
lines 20-23) Accordingly, the whereabouts of the legally 
described line between the properties would obviously 
and necessarily be uncertain as related to the fenceline. 
This uncertainty persisted from the time Mr. Leonidas 
G. Rile~· purchased the Riley property in 1920 until 1966, 
when for the first time a boundary survey was m-
dulged in. 
By reason of the foregoing, set forth in deposition, 
afficlaYit and testimony taken during the hearing of the 
motion for summary judgment, the four elements re-
quire>d to raise the presumption that a binding boundary 
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hy acqui<>sce!lC'f' agTec'mC'Ilt t>xistPd to scttlf' a tlispntP 11r 
mice rt a in hon nda ry \Ye re proved h!· com pet C>nt e\·ident·i· 
heforp the trial court. The clear proof of ( 1) OC'cnpan(':> 
up to a line ,·isihly marked h:· monuments, de. (~) ;l(•_ 
qnif'S('f'lll'P in thf' line as a hon11dar~- (:n for a long pPriod 
of ~·ears ( J) hy adjoining la11downC>rs C'omprised null 
does now comprisP a prima faciP "honndar:· h:· acq11il·'· 
c0nce" C'as0 in fanlr of the respornlent:-;. In thi:-; n•g;ml . 
.J ndge -Wahlquist said : 
''The Court believes that the evidence of thr 
defendants as such in this case \rnuld have to he 
aceepted hy a finder of fact unless refuted. 
The Court further finds that there is no eyj. 
dence to refute it." (T-23) 
Tlw appellants were thereafter unable to show lff 
"eompetent evidenee" that a houndan· was not thns 
established, en•n though a pNiod in t>xcess of two month' 
was a\·ailable to the appellants to aC'quire such e\·idenrr 
and pres0nt it to the court. Obviously, snch compdeut 
e\·idence apparently dOPs not 0xist. 
The incompetent aml belated 0\·id0nce, lwlated h:1 
four and one-half decades, which Daniel Murray D~n-i' 
desired to present conc0rni11g the alleged granting 0! 
oral permissive use of land North of the fenceline is in 
eonflict with -:\Tr. Da,·is 's other testimony and incon-
sistPnt with the fads as 110 larnl }forth of the fencelim· 
was ei·er USP(l h:· tl1(' Rileys. Tlw testimony concerniM 
oral permissi\·e us0 of snC'h larnl "'.'\ orth of the fe11celi11v 
,,·as corr0dly exclncled nrnler the dea<l man's statnte h:-
thr trial jmlge. (T-~::l) Th0 0\·ide11ce of appellant Ros' 
16 
.J. Davis's brother, Kelly, clearly based on hearsay 
( R--Hl), did not justify vacating the summary judgment 
l!'J°:lll t ed in fa rnr of the respondents hy trial .Judge ·w ahl-
qnist. ('r-26) 
CONCLUSION 
Th(• JH't•sent ease is <lire('tly related to the situation 
,,J1icl1 <1rose i11 Ki11q Y. Fronk. The following opinion of 
ilw t·omt in F'ro11k is as applicable in the present situa-
1 io11 ;1s it was to the case decided, namely: 
'' ... the passage of a long time, accompanied 
b.v an ancient Yisible linc>, marked by monuments 
with other pertinent and particular facts, and 
\vith a do-nothing history on the part of the par-
ties concerned, can result in putting to rest titles 
to property and prevent protracted and often 
belligerent litigation usually attended by dusty 
memory, departure of witnesses, unavailability 
of trustworthy testimony, irritation with neigh-
bors, and the like. This idea is based on the con-
cept that ''e must live together in the spirit jus-
t if~·ing rc>pose and fixation of titles where there 
has been a disposition on the part of neighbors 
to leav(' an ancient bournlary as is 11:itlrnut taking 
some affirmative action to assert rights incon-
sisf('nt 1cith eridence of a visiblP, long-st(]/Y/ding 
boundary. In the vernacular, the doctrine might 
b(' paraphrased to enunciate boundaries might be 
('Stablishf'd hy an 'I don't give a hoot' attitudf' 
on thc> part of neigh hors." (emphasis added) 
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The respondents have clearly established at the trial 
court a prima facie ''boundary by acquiescence'' case 
not refuted by competent testimony. It is respectfully 
submitted, therefore, that respondents are entitled to 
have he trial court's summary judgment in their faYor 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LYNN G. FOSTER 
6759 South 2445 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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Attorney for Defendants 
and Respondents 
